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ABSTRACT: The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (hereafter EPPO) was established by way of en-
hanced cooperation, with the adoption of Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 (hereafter EPPO Regu-
lation). It has the power to conduct criminal investigations and to directly act as the prosecuting 
authority before national criminal courts, which is revolutionary. Interestingly, the EPPO Regulation 
does not explicitly regulate the relation between the EPPO and national judges at the pre-trial stage, 
who may intervene punctually or, in some cases, even conduct the investigation. Indeed, some civil 
law systems have a system of shared investigation powers between the public prosecutor and the 
investigating judge, meaning that the latter conducts a judicial inquiry, while the former is responsi-
ble for the prosecution. This raises the delicate question whether a judicial inquiry is compatible with 
the EPPO Regulation. This Article analyses this question, which hugely impacts the implementation 
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of the EPPO, with respect to the Belgian legal system, based on a close reading of the EPPO Regula-
tion and taking into account its drafting history. It will argue that the EPPO Regulation is not per se 
irreconcilable with a judicial inquiry as the Member States did not wish the EPPO Regulation to alter 
the way in which criminal investigations are organised at national level. Subsequently, it will examine 
how an EPPO investigation conducted by an investigating judge can practically function and evaluate 
the Belgian EPPO Act. While the analysis concentrates on Belgium, the underlying reasoning may 
also be useful for other Member States with a similar legal system. 
 
KEYWORDS: European Public Prosecutor’s Office – EPPO Regulation – conformity with EU law – judicial 
inquiry – investigating judge – Belgium. 
I. A hybrid judicial actor entering the battlefield against EU fraud 
On 12 October 2017, the Council of the European Union adopted the Regulation establish-
ing the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (hereafter EPPO and EPPO Regulation).1 The 
Regulation was adopted via the procedure of enhanced cooperation, as provided by art. 
86(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereafter TFEU).2 It is the first 
(and thus revolutionary)3 European body with the power to conduct a criminal investigation 
and to directly act as a prosecuting authority before national criminal courts. 
The final EPPO Regulation is the fruit of conflicting visions and provides a much more 
complex structure for the EPPO than the one envisaged in the Commission’s proposal of 
2013.4 First of all, during the four years of negotiations on the Regulation,5 the EPPO 
shifted from a rather centralised hierarchical structure led by one person to a strongly 
 
1 Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of the Council of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation 
on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (“the EPPO”). 
2 So far, 22 Member States have joined the enhanced cooperation: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxem-
bourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. OLAF, European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office ec.europa.eu. 
3 D Flore, ‘Le parquet européen à la croisée des chemins’ in S Dewulf (ed), La [CVDW]. Liber Amicorum 
Chris Van den Wyngaert (Maklu 2017) 238. 
4 Proposals to create the EPPO date back to the nineties with the Corpus Juris. The idea was eventually 
introduced in art. 86 TFEU. In 2013, the Commission launched the Commission Proposal COM(2013) 534 
for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. For a full history 
of the debate on the creation of a European public prosecutor’s office: L Bachmaier Winter, ‘Introduction: 
the EPPO and the Challenges Ahead’ in L Bachmaier Winter (ed), The European Public Prosecutor’s Office: 
Challenges Ahead (Springer 2018) V; M Delmas-Marty (ed), Corpus Juris: Introducing Penal Provisions for the 
Purpose of the Financial Interests of the European Union (Economica 1997); D Flore, Droit pénal européen: Les 
enjeux d'une justice penale européenne (Larcier 2009); W Geelhoud, LH Erkelens and AWH Meij (eds), Shifting 
Perspectives on the European Prosecutor’s Office (Springer 2018); V Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (Oxford Hart 
2009); JAE Vervaele, ‘The European Community and Harmonisation of the Criminal Law Enforcement of 
Community Policy: Ignoti nulla cupido?’ in C Bassiouni, V Militello and H Satzger (eds), European Cooperation 
in Criminal Matters: Issues and Perspective (Cedam 2008) 31 ff. 
5 These long negotiations are reflected in the number of recitals. 
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decentralised model led by a college with representatives from each Member State.6 This 
gives the EPPO a strong intergovernmental flavour, contrary to the federal logic of the 
centralised model in the Commission’s proposal.7 Secondly, the references to national 
law have multiplied. While the proposal of the Commission referred 37 times to national 
law, the EPPO Regulation now contains 86 references. This shows some distrust among 
Member States and towards the European level, with a preference to remain in control 
as much as possible.8  
Like any other EU regulation, the EPPO Regulation is binding in its entirety and di-
rectly applicable in all (participating) Member States. It does not require transposition 
into national law.9 National law will thus have to be interpreted in conformity with the 
EPPO Regulation and any conflicting rule will be set aside.10 Nevertheless, as indicated, 
the EPPO Regulation is full of compromises and refers to national law for several matters 
instead of regulating them at the European level.11 Hence, the functioning of the EPPO is, 
to a large extent, governed by national rules of criminal procedure. In order to get na-
tional legislation in line with the EPPO Regulation and make the EPPO function properly, 
some adjustments in the national legislation might, however, be required. Member States 
will thus inevitably have to manoeuvre between the rules determined in the EPPO Regu-
lation and the margin of appreciation it leaves in order to respect the diversity of rules 
on national criminal procedure.12 
 
6 L Bachmaier Winter, ‘Introduction: the EPPO and the Challenges Ahead’ cit. VI; JAE Vervaele, ‘The 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO): Introductory Remarks’ in W Geelhoud, LH Erkelens and AWH 
Meij (eds), Shifting Perspectives on the European Prosecutor’s Office cit. 12 ff. 
7 For one of the first analyses of the Commission’s proposal, see V Franssen, ‘Proposed Regulation on 
the European Public Prosecutor – Thinking Federal?’ (8 August 2013) European Law Blog 
europeanlawblog.eu. 
8 D Flore, ‘Le parquet européen à la croisée des chemins’ cit. 230. Or, to quote A Weyembergh and C 
Brière, the Member States’ “willingness to renationalise the EPPO as much as possible, and to keep the 
strongest control possible over its activities”. A Weyembergh and C Brière, ‘Towards a European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), Study for the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament’ (2016) European 
Parliament www.europarl.europa.eu 51. 
9 Art. 288 TFEU. 
10 This follows from the principle of precedence of EU law; art. 5(3) EPPO Regulation cit. 
11 L Seiler, ‘Le parquet européen: une révolution sans bouleversements’ (2019) Revue de droit pénal 
et de criminologie 1188. 
12 V Franssen, A Werding, AL Claes and F Verbruggen, ‘La mise en œuvre du parquet européen en 
Belgique: quelques enjeux et propositions de solution’ in C Chevallier-Govers and A Weyembergh (eds), La 
création du Parquet européen. Simple évolution ou revolution au sein de l’espace judiciaire européen (Bruylant 
2021) 135, 144 ff.; F Verbruggen, V Franssen, AL Claes and A Werding, ‘Implementation of the EPPO in Bel-
gium: Making the Best of a (Politically) Forced Marriage?’ (18 November 2019) European Law Blog 
europeanlawblog.eu. 
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This Article focuses on an issue that the EPPO Regulation does not explicitly address, 
although it is particularly delicate for the implementation of the EPPO in some legal sys-
tems,13 namely the relation between the EPPO and the national judges at the pre-trial stage.  
Today, most civil law systems put the prosecutor at the centre of the pre-trial investi-
gation with the power to decide on the orientation of the investigation and to direct the 
police and other law enforcement authorities. For certain more intrusive investigation 
measures, the prosecutor might be legally obliged to obtain the authorisation of a pre-trial 
judge (e.g., the Ermittlungsrichter in Germany).14 Such obligation is fully compatible with the 
EPPO Regulation.15 However, other civil law systems (like Belgium, France, Luxembourg16 
and Spain17) provide a system of shared investigation powers between the public prosecu-
tor and the investigating judge (juge d’instruction). In these systems, the investigating judge 
not only authorises investigation measures, but can actually conduct the investigation and 
decide on its orientation. This type of investigation is called a judicial inquiry.18  
This Article concentrates on the Belgian system,19 and the question whether the in-
tervention of the Belgian pre-trial judges in EPPO cases is compatible with the EPPO Reg-
ulation. Since the latter is based on the prosecutorial model,20  it is unsure whether, and 
how, an investigating judge can still carry out the pre-trial investigation. 
As it will be argued below, the EPPO Regulation does not prohibit the Belgian judicial 
inquiry, even though the latter does not match the philosophy behind the EPPO. This does 
not mean, however, that the conclusion will necessarily be the same for other legal systems 
with a judicial inquiry. Since some aspects of the organisation of the judicial inquiry might 
 
13 In Spain, e.g., this is still one of the main stumbling blocks for the implementation of the EPPO. See 
e.g., Europa Press, El CGPJ advierte de las dificultades de adaptar la Fiscalía Europea en España con la actual 
LECrim www.europapress.es. 
14 K Ligeti, ‘The Place of the Prosecutor in Common Law and Civil Law Jurisdictions’ in DK Brown, J 
Iontcheva Turner and B Weisser (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Process (Oxford University Press 
2019) 139, 146. 
15 Arts 30(2) and 30(5) EPPO Regulation cit.: “The procedures and the modalities for taking the 
measures shall be governed by the applicable national law”. This also follows from art. 31 on cross-border 
investigations. To note that the original proposal of the Commission included an EU-wide requirement of 
a prior judicial authorisation for the EPPO’s most intrusive investigation measures (art. 26(4)). In the final 
text of the EPPO Regulation, there is no trace left of this partial approximation of national rules. 
16 For a presentation of the powers of the Luxembourgish juge d’instruction, see J Nies, ‘A Special Toolkit 
of Investigation Techniques in Luxembourg’ in K Ligeti and V Franssen (eds), Challenges in the field of eco-
nomic and financial crime in Europe (Hart 2017) 86-88. 
17 For a presentation of the powers of the Spanish juez de instrucción, see L Bachmaier Winter and A 
del Moral García, ‘Spain’ in F Verbruggen and V Franssen (eds), International Encyclopaedia of Laws: Criminal 
Law (Wolters Kluwer 2020) 34-35 and 215-217. 
18 K Ligeti, ‘The Place of the Prosecutor in Common Law and Civil Law Jurisdictions’ cit. 146 and 147. 
19 I.e., the legal system the authors are most familiar with. Nonetheless, the analysis will also encom-
pass some punctual comparison with other legal systems, in particular France, Luxembourg and Spain. 
20 Z Đurđević, ‘Judicial Control in Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure Conducted by the European Public Pros-
ecutor’s Office’ in K Ligeti (ed), Towards a prosecutor for the European union (Hart 2013), 986, 987. 
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be different, the solution might differ too. The goal of this Article is twofold. On the one 
hand, it aims to stimulate the reflection process among Member States on whether their 
legal system meets the requirements of the EPPO Regulation, preferably before making far-
reaching and maybe unnecessary adjustments, by the time the EPPO launches its first in-
vestigations.21 On the other hand, it intends to evaluate some of the changes made recently 
by the Belgian legislator to implement the EPPO in the national legal order, in particular 
those relating to the role of the investigating judge and the pre-trial tribunal and court.22  
The analysis will be structured as follows. Part II will briefly summarise the main fea-
tures of the EPPO Regulation that are relevant for the relation between the EPPO and 
Belgian pre-trial judges. Next, Part III will provide a concise overview of the functioning of 
the judicial inquiry under current Belgian law. It should be noted that this system might 
fundamentally change in the coming years, as a comprehensive reform of Belgian crimi-
nal procedure is in the make,23 but this reform will certainly not be finalised by the time 
the EPPO becomes operational. Subsequently, Part IV will present the main arguments 
supporting the thesis that the EPPO Regulation does not prohibit the Belgian judicial in-
quiry in EPPO cases. This reasoning will be based on the current wording but also on the 
drafting history of the EPPO Regulation. In Part V, we will conduct a step-by-step analysis 
of how a judicial inquiry in EPPO cases, from beginning to end, could function within the 
Belgian legal framework, without changing the way in which criminal investigations are 
essentially organised. Part VI will assess whether the Belgian EPPO Act has made all nec-
essary amendments with respect to the judicial inquiry to be in line with the EPPO Regu-
lation. In the conclusion, we will present our general findings. 
II. Brief overview of the EPPO’s relevant features 
The protection of the EU’s financial interests is a shared competence between the EU and 
its Member States.24 The EPPO is created to enhance this protection through criminal en-
forcement at EU level. Therefore, the EPPO is competent to investigate and prosecute, 
for example, fraud involving EU subsidies, VAT-fraud, customs fraud and other criminal 
 
21 According to the most recent information, the EPPO would start its operational activities on 1 June 
2021. See EPPO, Start date of EPPO operations: European Chief Prosecutor proposes 1 June 2021 to the European 
Commission (7 April 2021) www.eppo.europa.eu. 
22 Act of 17 February 2021 holding several provisions in criminal justice matters (Loi du 17 février 2021 
portant des dispositions diverses en matière de justice), Moniteur belge 24 February 2021 (hereafter Belgian 
EPPO Act).  
23 MA Beernaert, ‘Le nouveau Code de procédure pénale en projet: quelques lignes de force’ in V 
Franssen and A Masset (ed), Actualités de Droit Pénal et de Procédure Pénale (Anthemis 2019) 133; R Ver-
straeten and A Bailleux, ‘Het voorstel van een nieuw wetboek van strafvordering: algemene beginselen en 
fase van het onderzoek’ in A Bailleux, B Spriet, R Van Herpe, J Vanheule, F Verbruggen and R Verstraeten, 
Themis: Straf- en strafprocesrecht (die Keure 2019) 143. 
24 Art. 325 TFEU. 
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offences like passive and active corruption. The material scope of the EPPO is defined by 
referral to Directive (EU) 2017/1371 on the fight against fraud to the EU’s financial inter-
ests25 (hereafter PFI Directive).26 In addition to the offences described in the PFI Directive, 
the EPPO is also competent for any other criminal offence that is inextricably linked to 
those in the PFI Directive, including offences committed within a criminal organisation.27  
The organisational structure of the EPPO can be summarised as follows. It has a central 
office in Luxembourg and decentralised offices in the Member States.28 The central level is 
composed of the European Chief Prosecutor (and his deputies), the College, the Permanent 
Chambers, the European Prosecutors (who form the College),29 and the Administrative Di-
rector.30 The decentralised level consists of the European Delegated Prosecutors (hereafter 
EDPs) in the participating Member States.31 The central level takes up two main tasks. First, 
the College takes decisions on strategic matters, including determining priorities or decid-
ing on general issues arising from individual cases.32 Second, the Permanent Chamber and 
the European Prosecutor (of the Member State where the investigation is conducted) su-
pervise and direct specific EPPO investigations.33 The actual investigation and prosecution 
measures are undertaken at the decentralised level in the participating Member States, by 
the EDPs who are part of the national prosecution service.34  
The EPPO Regulation emphasises the independence of the EPPO.35 The European 
prosecutors cannot seek nor take instructions from any person or institution outside the 
EPPO’s structure, and always have to act in the interest of the EU as a whole. For the EDPs 
this becomes quite complex, as they are “active members of the national prosecution 
 
25 Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight 
against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law. 
26 Art. 22(1) EPPO Regulation cit. 
27 Ibid. art. 22(3). 
28 F Verbruggen, V Franssen, AL Claes and A Werding ‘Implementation of the EPPO in Belgium: Making 
the Best of a (Politically) Forced Marriage?’ cit. 
29 The European Prosecutors, forming together with the European Chief Prosecutor the EPPO College, 
were appointed on 27 July 2020. Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/1117 of the Council of 27 July 2020 ap-
pointing the European Prosecutors of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. 
30 Art. 8(3) EPPO Regulation cit. 
31 Ibid. art. 8(4) and recital 21; AM Santos, ‘The Status of Independence of the European Public Prose-
cutor’s Office and Its Guarantees’ in L Bachmaier Winter (ed), The European Public Prosecutor’s Office: Chal-
lenges Ahead (Springer 2018) 8. 
32 Art. 9 EPPO Regulation cit. and recital 24. 
33 Ibid. arts 10 and 12; AM Santos, ‘The Status of Independence of the European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office and Its Guarantees’ cit. 10-11 and 13-14. 
34 Ibid. art. 17(2). 
35 Ibid. art. 6(1). 
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service”36 and may, besides conducting EPPO investigations, also exercise tasks as na-
tional prosecutors.37 It is also important to stress that while investigating and prosecut-
ing, the EDPs have “the same powers as national prosecutors”.38 A Belgian EDP will thus 
have the same investigation and prosecutorial powers as any other Belgian prosecutor. 
III. The Belgian system of judicial inquiries 
In Belgium, criminal investigations are always led by a judicial authority, either the public 
prosecutor or the investigating judge.39 The preliminary inquiry (called the information)40 
is led by a (federal)41 prosecutor, whereas the judicial inquiry (or instruction)42 is con-
ducted by an investigating judge.43  
There are several possibilities to open a judicial inquiry. It is often the prosecutor who 
decides to refer a case to the investigating judge and asks him (or her) to investigate 
specific facts.44 For most offences (in particular, crimes and misdemeanours (délits)), the 
victim too can request the investigating judge to start an inquiry, by means of a complaint 
with civil party petition (plainte avec constitution de partie civile).45 Furthermore, in some 
cases, the investigating judge has the power to launch a judicial inquiry at his own initia-
tive (infra, mini-judicial inquiry). Once a judicial inquiry is opened, the investigating judge 
is in charge of and directs the investigation. This means he gives instructions to the police 
and any other competent authority, which will execute them.  
The reason for referral to an investigating judge is that the prosecutor has less ex-
tensive powers than the investigating judge.46 For instance, only the investigating judge 
has the power to order the production of traffic and location data concerning electronic 
 
36 Ibid. art. 17(2). 
37 D Flore, ‘Le parquet européen à la croisée des chemins’ cit. 232-233. 
38 Art. 13(1) EPPO Regulation cit. Emphasis added. 
39 K Ligeti, ‘The Place of the Prosecutor in Common Law and Civil Law Jurisdictions’ cit. 146. 
40 Belgian Code of Criminal Procedure (Code d’instruction criminelle, hereafter CIC), art. 28bis. 
41 The prosecutor (procureur du Roi) is competent to investigate and prosecute in his own judicial dis-
trict. If he wants to accomplish an investigation measure in another district, he has to inform the prosecutor 
of that district. Arts 137 and 150 Belgian Judicial Code of 10 October 1967 (Code judiciaire), Moniteur Belge 
31 October 1967; art. 23 CIC cit. The Belgian Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office is a distinct prosecution 
service that can act throughout the whole Belgian territory. It is, for instance, competent to prosecute cases 
that have an international dimension or concern several districts, or cases regarding terrorist offences or 
criminal organisations. Arts 143, 144ter and 144quater Belgian Judicial Code cit; MA Beernaert, HD Bosly 
and D Vandermeersch, Droit de la procédure pénale (la Charte 2017) 340. 
42 Art. 55 CIC cit.  
43 O Michiels and G Falque, Principes de procédure pénale (Larcier 2019) 227. 
44 Art. 61 CIC cit. 
45 Ibid. art. 63(1). 
46 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the prosecutor has more powers when and as long as there is 
a situation of flagrant délit (i.e., when an offence is being committed or has recently been committed, see 
arts 41 and 46 CIC cit.). 
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communications47 and to take a DNA sample from a suspect against his will or from a 
minor below the age of 16 years.48  
It should be noted, though, that there are quite some cases where the prosecutor 
can ask an investigating judge to accomplish an investigation measure that falls within 
the latter’s competence without formally opening a judicial inquiry. This procedure, cre-
ated in 1998, is called a “mini judicial inquiry” (mini-instruction). The investigating judge 
can decide to grant or refuse the prosecutor’s request. If he decides to authorise the 
investigation measure, he is allowed to keep the case file and start a judicial inquiry on 
his own initiative. Otherwise, he is obliged to return the file to the prosecutor.49 Never-
theless, a limited number of intrusive measures can never be conducted through a mini 
judicial inquiry and thus always require a full-blown judicial inquiry, e.g., an arrest warrant 
which marks the beginning of pre-trial detention,50 the search of private premises51 or 
the secret interception of private communications.52 
As follows from the previous paragraphs, the investigating judge does not merely 
exercise judicial control over coercive investigation measures. In some cases, he is also 
in charge of and directs the criminal investigation and thus can be said to wear two 
“hats”.53 This does not mean, however, that during the judicial inquiry, the public prose-
cutor becomes a powerless bystander. Even though he cannot give orders to the investi-
gating judge, which is a logical consequence of the judge’s independence, he keeps sev-
eral prerogatives.54 For instance, the prosecutor may at any moment request access to 
the file and ask the investigating judge to conduct specific investigation measures.55 In 
 
47 Art. 88bis CIC cit. 
48 Ibid. art. 90undecies. 
49 Ibid. 28septies. MA Beernaert, HD Bosly and D Vandermeersch, Droit de la procédure pénale cit. 624-
628. 
50 Act on pre-trial custody (Loi du 20 juillet 1990 relative à la détention préventive), Moniteur belge 14 
August 1990 art. 16. 
51 Art. 89bis CIC cit. 
52 Ibid. art. 90ter. It is worth pointing out that this investigation measure also encompasses secret 
searches in information systems and extends to all content of private communications, even if the com-
munication is no longer in transmission. For a more detailed analysis of this legal provision, see V Franssen 
and O Leroux, ‘Recherche policière et judiciaire sur internet: analyse critique du nouveau cadre législatif 
belge’ in V Franssen and D Flore (eds), Société numérique et droit pénal. Système, Système, Europe (Lar-
cier/Bruylant 2019) 161-165. 
53 This double hat, giving rise to an “ambivalent role”, has been criticised and is one of the reasons why 
the authors of the reform of the Belgian Code of Criminal Procedure propose to replace the investigating 
judge by a pre-trial judge (see infra). See e.g., MA Beernaert, ‘Le nouveau Code de procédure pénale en 
projet: quelques lignes de force’ cit. 136-137. 
54 MA Beernaert, HD Bosly and D Vandermeersch, Droit de la procédure pénale cit. 826-827. 
55 According to Belgian criminal procedure, the public prosecutor has a general right of action on the 
basis of art. 1 Loi contenant le titre préliminaire du code de procédure pénale and art. 22 CIC cit. R Declercq, 
Beginselen van strafrechtspleging (6th ed Kluwer 2014) 316; R Verstraeten and F Verbruggen, Strafrecht en 
strafprocesrecht voor bachelors (12th ed Intersentia 2019) 159. 
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case of refusal, he may appeal the decision of the investigating judge before the pre-trial 
court (chambre des mises en accusation).56 In addition, he can always,57 and in particular 
during the supervision of lengthy investigations,58 ask the pre-trial court to give orders to 
the investigating judge59 or, in extreme cases, to remove the latter from the case.60  
When the investigating judge has completed the judicial inquiry, the public prosecu-
tor receives the criminal file back in view of drafting the final submissions61 in which he 
defines the charges and indicates whether the case should be referred for trial or dis-
missed. At this stage, the prosecutor can still request the investigating judge to accom-
plish further investigation measures to complete the investigation.62 When the public 
prosecutor has drafted his final submissions, he brings the case to the pre-trial tribunal 
(chambre du conseil), which will decide whether or not to refer the case for trial to the 
competent court.63 Being independent and impartial,64 the pre-trial tribunal is obviously 
not obliged to follow the public prosecutor’s final submissions. Under certain conditions, 
the parties (including the public prosecutor) can appeal the decision of the pre-trial tribu-
nal before the pre-trial court.65  
It is uncertain whether the judicial inquiry will continue to exist under Belgian law.66 
Indeed, the previous Belgian government that came into power in 2014 decided to revise 
the whole criminal procedure and set up a reform commission of experts to prepare a new 
Code.67 The reasons for this comprehensive reform of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Code 
 
56 This right of appeal is a consequence of the prosecutor’s general right of action. Belgian Court of Cas-
sation judgment of 22 March 1994 n. P.94.202 N; Declercq, Beginselen van strafrechtspleging cit. 316-317.  
57 Art. 136bis CIC cit. 
58 Ibid. art. 136bis(1). 
59 Ibid. art. 228. 
60 Ibid. art. 235. 
61 We opted for this term and not “indictment” as this document is not a formal charging decision that 
brings the case to the trial court. It is the pre-trial tribunal (or, upon appeal, the pre-trial court) that refers 
the case for trial; this (court) decision determines which suspects are referred, for which facts and under 
which charges. This terminological distinction is important for the analysis made in Part V. 
62 Art. 127 CIC cit. 
63 Ibid. art. 128. Other decisions like e.g., grant the suspension of the ruling are also possible. 
64 Art. 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights [1950] and art. 47(2) of the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the European Union [2012]. 
65 Art. 135 CIC cit. 
66 Interestingly, the same reflection is ongoing in Spain where a major reform of the Spanish criminal 
procedure would encompass the abolition of the investigating judge and the creation of a pre-trial judge 
(juez de garantías). The draft bill entailing this reform (Anteproyecto de Ley de Enjuiciamento Criminal) was 
published in the course of 2020 and can be consulted at: www.mjusticia.gob.es, in particular 59-60. An 
impact analysis was published in January 2021: ‘Anteproyecto de Ley Orgánica de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, 
Memoria del Análisis de Impacto Normativo’, Ministerio de Justicia www.mjusticia.gob.es. 
67 Ministerial Decree setting up the commissions for the reform of criminal law and criminal procedure 
(Arrêté ministériel de 30 octobre portant création des Commissions de réforme du droit pénal et de la procédure 
pénale), Moniteur belge 29 December 2015. 
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d’instruction criminelle, hereafter CIC) are multiple: the legislation is outdated (it dates back 
to the 19th century) and, due to many punctual reforms over time, it has become incoherent 
and a difficult read, resulting in strong critiques.68 One of the major novelties of the pro-
posed reform is the creation of a unified pre-trial investigation, which puts an end to the 
classic distinction between a preliminary and a judicial inquiry. According to the proposal 
of the experts, the prosecutor would be in charge of the investigation, but would have to 
request the ex ante authorisation of a pre-trial judge (juge de l’enquête) for coercive 
measures that infringe upon fundamental rights or freedoms.69 Moreover, the pre-trial 
judge would exercise judicial control on the investigation.70 Clearly, this future system much 
more resembles the underlying logic of the EPPO, according to which the public prosecutor 
is in charge of the investigation. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether this proposal 
will eventually result in a new Code of Criminal Procedure.71 Indeed, the proposed reform 
is facing quite strong opposition from the judiciary and some legal scholars72 as the inves-
tigating judge is considered a fundamental feature of Belgian criminal procedure. The new 
Belgian government, which took office on 1 October 2020, has confirmed its intention to 
reform the Code of Criminal Procedure, taking the proposals made by the reform commis-
sion appointed by the previous government as a starting point for further discussions, but 
has also indicated that it will appoint a new commission of experts.73  
IV. Is a judicial inquiry compatible with the EPPO Regulation? 
iv.1. No unambiguous prohibition of judicial inquiries  
The functioning of the EPPO is based on the prosecutorial model (without any role for 
the investigating judge) that can be found in most countries of the EU.74 As a conse-
quence, one might read into the provisions of the EPPO Regulation that the EPPO is based 
on the idea of prosecutors having full investigation and prosecutorial powers and that it 
 
68 MA Beernaert, ‘Le nouveau Code de procédure pénale en projet: quelques lignes de force’ cit. 134. 
69 Ibid. 135 and 141-142; R Verstraeten and A Bailleux, ‘Het voorstel van een nieuw wetboek van 
strafvordering: algemene beginselen en fase van het onderzoek’ cit. 146. 
70 MA Beernaert, ‘Le Nouveau Code de procédure pénale en projet: quelques lignes de force’ cit. 143-146. 
71 The reform proposed by the Commission resulted in a Bill that was brought before Parliament in 
May 2020: Proposition de loi contenant le Code de procedure pénale, Doc. Parl., Ch. représ., sess. ord., 2019-
2020, n. 55-1239/001. However, at the moment of finalising this contribution, the parliamentary discussions 
have not yet started.  
72 See e.g., M Claise, ‘Ne tirez pas sur le juge financier’ in M Cadelli (eds), La figure du juge d’instruction: 
réformer ou supprimer? (Anthemis 2017) 57, 59 and 63. 
73 P Magnette and A De Croo, ‘Rapport des formateurs/Verslag van de formateurs’ (30 September 
2020) Média des Bruxelles bx1.be 48-49.  
74 DA Alvarez, ‘The EPPO Implementation. A Perspective from Spain’ (2018) eucrim 124. 
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therefore prohibits systems with an investigating judge.75 Or, to put it simply, judicial in-
quiries do not match the philosophy of the EPPO Regulation. 
Especially art. 28(1) of the EPPO Regulation could, following this vision, be read as an 
affirmation that only the EDP can take the lead of the investigation: “The [EDP] handling a 
case may, in accordance with this Regulation and with national law, either undertake the in-
vestigation measures and other measures on his/her own or instruct the competent authorities 
in his/her Member State. Those authorities shall, in accordance with national law, ensure that 
all instructions are followed and undertake the measures assigned to them”.76 
When reading art. 28(1), the emphasis could indeed rest on the EDP “handling a case” 
with the power to either undertake the (investigation) measures on his own or to “in-
struct” the competent national authorities to carry them out, leaving no margin of discre-
tion for these authorities. It could moreover be stressed that the title of art. 28 “Conduct-
ing the investigation”77 could be interpreted as allowing only the EDPs to conduct, and 
thus lead, an EPPO investigation.78  
Nevertheless, neither a provision of the EPPO Regulation, nor its general philosophy 
based on a prosecutorial model can, in our view, lead to the conclusion that the EPPO 
Regulation explicitly forbids a system with an investigating judge. Despite the wording of 
art. 28(1), it does not prescribe in any way that an investigation in EPPO cases can only 
be led by the EDP himself (contrary to earlier versions of the Regulation, infra, IV.2). 
 
75 JB Jacquin, ‘Les pouvoirs hors normes du futur parquet européen’ (19 August 2019) Le Monde 
www.lemonde.fr; J Nies, ‘La répartition des rôles entre le Parquet européen et les parquets nationaux’ 
(2019) Journal des tribunaux 11, 13; J Bigot and S Joissains, ‘Rapport d’information fait au nom de la com-
mission des affaires européennes sur la coopération judiciaire en matière pénale et la mise en œuvre du 
parquet européen’ (16 May 2019) Sénat www.senat.fr; L Seiler, ‘Le parquet européen: une révolution sans 
bouleversements’ cit. 1212; HH Herrnfeld, D Brodowski and C Burchard, European Public Prosecutor’s Office: 
Article-by-Article Commentary (Hart Publishing 2020) 249 and 252. 
76 Emphasis added. Cfr other language versions of the EPPO Regulation: e.g., French: “Le procureur eu-
ropéen délégué chargé d’une affaire peut, conformément au présent règlement et au droit national, soit prendre 
des mesures d’enquête et d’autres mesures de sa propre initiative, soit en charger les autorités compétentes de son 
État membre. Lesdites autorités veillent, conformément au droit national, à ce que toutes les instructions soient 
suivies et prennent les mesures qu’elles ont été chargées de prendre. Le procureur européen délégué chargé 
de l’affaire utilise le système de gestion des dossiers pour signaler au procureur européen compétent et à la 
chambre permanente tout événement important concernant l’affaire, conformément aux règles établies dans 
le règlement intérieur du Parquet européen” (emphasis added). E.g., German: “Der mit einem Verfahren be-
traute Delegierte Europäische Staatsanwalt kann im Einklang mit dieser Verordnung und dem nationalen Recht 
die Ermittlungsmaßnahmen und andere Maßnahmen entweder selbst treffen oder die zuständigen Behörden seines 
Mitgliedstaats dazu anweisen. Diese Behörden stellen im Einklang mit dem nationalen Recht sicher, dass alle Wei-
sungen befolgt werden, und treffen die ihnen zugewiesenen Maßnahmen. Der betraute Delegierte Europäi-
sche Staatsanwalt unterrichtet gemäß den in der Geschäftsordnung der EUStA festgelegten Vorschriften den 
zuständigen Europäischen Staatsanwalt und die Ständige Kammer durch das Fallmanagementsystem von al-
len wesentlichen Entwicklungen des Falles” (emphasis added). 
77 “Conduite de l’enquête” in French and “Führung der Ermittlungen” in German. 
78 MA Beernaert, ‘Le Nouveau Code de Procédure Pénale en Projet: Quelques Lignes de Force’ cit. 139. 
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First of all, the EU legislator did not create a European criminal court or European 
pre-trial courts (as opposed to the proposal made by the Corpus juris,79 for instance). He 
limited himself to the creation of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office that will act before 
national courts. In addition, as explained above, there are many references to national 
law in the EPPO Regulation. To conduct criminal proceedings, the EPPO will thus have to 
rely, to a large extent, on national rules of criminal procedure. Therefore, Ligeti considers 
the EPPO Regulation compatible with different forms of authority and division of tasks 
between the actors in the criminal process at the national level.80  
Most significant in this regard, is recital 15, which emphasises that “[the] Regulation is 
without prejudice to Member States’ national systems concerning the way in which criminal 
investigations are organised”.81 Furthermore, recital 12 states that, “[i]n accordance with 
the principle of proportionality […], this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in 
order to achieve those objectives and ensures that its impact on the legal orders and the insti-
tutional structures of the Member States is the least intrusive possible”.82 
In light of these recitals, art. 28(1) of the EPPO Regulation does not necessarily ex-
clude the intervention of an investigating judge in EPPO cases. Otherwise, it would force 
Member States to change “the way in which criminal investigations are organised” and 
have a far-reaching impact on “the institutional structures of the Member States”, partic-
ularly in Belgium where the Constitutional Court has insisted on the importance of up-
holding the procedural safeguards offered by the judicial inquiry (which are higher than 
those in a preliminary inquiry)83 and where, as indicated supra, the judicial inquiry is still 
regarded by many stakeholders as a fundamental pillar of national criminal procedure. 
Instead, when reading art. 28(1), the emphasis could rest on conducting the investigation 
“in accordance with national law” (including investigations led by investigating judges), a 
reference to national law that was added by the Member States during the negotiations 
(infra, IV.2). If art. 28(1) was meant to oblige national legislators to abolish investigating 
 
79 For a concise analysis of the role of the pre-trial judge (taking the form of a juge des libertés) and the 
option of creating a European pre-trial court in the Corpus juris, see K Ligeti and V Franssen, ‘Le contrôle 
juridictionnel dans les projets de Parquet européen’ in G Giudicelli-Delage, S Manacorda and J Tricot (eds), 
Le contrôle judiciaire du Parquet européen: Nécessité, modèles, enjeux (Société de législation comparée 2014) 
127, 134-139. 
80 K Ligeti, ‘The Place of the Prosecutor in Common Law and Civil Law Jurisdictions’ cit. 160. 
81 The same interpretation counts for other language versions of the EPPO Regulation. E.g., in German: 
“Diese Verordnung lässt die nationalen Systeme der Mitgliedstaaten in Bezug auf die art. und Weise, wie 
strafrechtliche Ermittlungen organisiert werden, unberührt, or in French: “Le présent règlement s’applique 
sans préjudice des systèmes nationaux des États membres concernant la manière dont les enquêtes pé-
nales sont organisées” (emphasis added). 
82 Emphasis added. 
83 See e.g., Belgian Constitutional Court judgment of 25 January 2017 n. 6/2017 (2017) Nullum Crimen 
351, case comment by S Raats; Belgian Constitutional Court judgment of 21 December 2017 n. 148/2017, 
para. B.22.4; R Verstraeten and A Bailleux, ‘Het voorstel van een nieuw wetboek van strafvordering: alge-
mene beginselen en fase van het onderzoek’ cit. 149-150. 
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judges in EPPO cases, and thus fundamentally change “the way in which criminal investi-
gations are organised”, then this should have been done unambiguously and without the 
insertion of recital 15 (at the initiative of the Member States, infra, IV.2).  
As a consequence, even if art. 28(1) determines that the EDP can “instruct”84 the com-
petent national authorities to undertake (investigation) measures and that the latter have 
to “ensure that all instructions are followed and undertake the measures assigned to 
them”, this does not mean that the public prosecutor can force a judge to undertake a 
certain investigation measure. Another interpretation would make the references to na-
tional law, but also the authorisation of the judge, which is a necessary condition for cer-
tain intrusive investigation measures in light of European law,85 pointless.  
Moreover, art. 30(1) of the EPPO Regulation sets that “Member States shall ensure that 
the European Delegated Prosecutors are entitled to order or request” at least the six inves-
tigation measures including the interception of electronic communications and the search 
of premises,86 and art. 30(4) of the EPPO Regulation states that “[t]he European Delegated 
Prosecutors shall be entitled to request or to order any other measures in their Member 
State that are available to prosecutors under national law in similar national cases, in addi-
tion to the measures referred to in paragraph 1”.87 Art. 30(3) and (5) further stresses that 
Member States can subject these investigation measures to conditions or limitations. The 
procedures and modalities for taking investigation measures shall thus be governed by the 
applicable national law. This includes making the investigation measure conditional upon 
 
84 In French “charger” and in German “anweisen”. 
85 For instance, the European Court of Human Rights has emphasised the importance of a judicial 
warrant with respect to the search of private premises (ECtHR Sociétés Colas Est and Others v France App n. 
37971/97 [16 April 2002] para. 49) and personal searches (ECtHR Kobiashvili v Georgia App n. 36416/06 [14 
March 2019] paras 39-41 and 61-71). At the EU level, the need for a court order is explicitly required for the 
production of “transactional” and content data by service providers in the Commission’s proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European production and preservation or-
ders for electronic evidence in criminal matters (art. 4(2) COM(2018) 225 final). If adopted this way, this will 
be a new step in the approximation of national law, as the EU legislator has so far only required the inter-
vention of a “judicial authority”, which can be a judge or a public prosecutor. See e.g., art. 6 Framework 
Decision 2002/584/JHA of the Council of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States. That said, the Court of Justice has emphasised, with respect to the 
European arrest warrant, the need for the intervention of an independent (issuing and executing) judicial 
authority, a standard that is, for instance, not met by German nor by Dutch public prosecutors as they can 
receive instructions from the executive. Joined cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU Ministry for Justice and 
Equality v OG and PI ECLI:EU:C:2019:456 para. 88; Case C-510/19 AZ ECLI:EU:C:2020:953 paras 56 and 70. 
Moreover, in the field of data retention, the Court has recently ruled that a measure authorising the real-
time collection of traffic and location data must “be subject to a prior review carried out either by a court 
or by an independent administrative body whose decision is binding”. Joined cases C-511/18, C-512/18 and 
C-520/18 La Quadrature du Net and Others ECLI:EU:C:2020:791 para. 189. 
86 Emphasis added. 
87 Emphasis added. 
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the authorisation of a pre-trial judge. Indeed, unlike the Commission’s proposal,88 the EPPO 
Regulation does not contain any minimum rules on judicial authorisation and thus leaves 
national criminal procedure, as far as this aspect is concerned, unaffected. 
In this regard, it is also worthwhile referring to recital 87, highlighting that “the pro-
cedural acts of the EPPO that are adopted before the indictment and intended to produce 
legal effects vis-à-vis third parties (a category which includes the suspect, the victim, and 
other interested persons whose rights may be adversely affected by such acts) are sub-
ject to judicial review by national courts […] in accordance with the requirements and proce-
dures laid down by national law”.89  
What follows from the above provisions, is that EDPs will be able to give orders to 
national authorities such as the police and administrative authorities under the same 
conditions as prosecutors in similar national cases. However, if national law requires the 
intervention of a judge, the EDPs will have to “request” the investigation measure.90 
Whether this judge only intervenes punctually (like the Ermittlungsrichter in Germany), ex 
ante or ex post, or takes over and leads the investigation from that moment onwards (like 
the juge d’instruction in Belgium) is not defined by the Regulation.91 An EDP could thus 
request the Belgian investigating judge to conduct a measure that requires, under Bel-
gian law, his ex ante intervention and potentially even request the opening of a judicial 
inquiry (supra, III). The judge being independent and impartial, he could, however, not be 
obliged to authorise the requested measure.92  
Still, it should be stressed that to be able to effectively conduct the investigation and 
undertake the necessary investigation measures,93 the EPPO strongly relies on national 
authorities, whether through an order or a request. In light of the principle of sincere 
cooperation, all national authorities, including the investigating judge, should actively 
support EPPO investigations and cooperate with the EPPO.94  
In sum, the EPPO Regulation does, in our view, not prohibit the intervention of an 
investigating judge in EPPO cases. As Pradel rightly concludes, “la présence active du pro-
cureur européen délégué est compatible avec les fonctions du juge national de la mise 
en état, en application d’une sorte de répartition des pouvoirs sous le double signe de 
 
88 Art. 26(4) Proposal for a Regulation COM(2013) 534 cit. 
89 Emphasis added. 
90 It should also be noted that, contrary to the Commission’s initial proposal, the EPPO Regulation does 
not set minimum requirements regarding the need of a judicial authorisation for intrusive investigation 
measures. F Verbruggen, V Franssen, AL Claes and A Werding ‘Implementation of the EPPO in Belgium: 
Making the Best of a (Politically) Forced Marriage?’ cit. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Pradel comes to the same conclusion: J Pradel, ‘Le parquet européen est-il compatible avec les juges 
nationaux de la mise en état en affaires pénales?’ (2019) Recueil Dalloz 650. 
93 Recital 70 EPPO Regulation cit. 
94 Recital 69 and art. 5(6) EPPO Regulation cit.; F Verbruggen, V Franssen, AL Claes and A Werding 
‘Implementation of the EPPO in Belgium: Making the Best of a (Politically) Forced Marriage?’ cit. 
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l’efficacité européenne et de la souveraineté nationale. Le juge d’instruction, notamment, 
devrait donc être maintenu. Et la confiance mutuelle pourrait faire le reste”.95 In addition 
to the above, it should be emphasised that the EPPO still remains a public prosecutor’s 
office96 and does not affect the competences of national judges. What matters, to quote 
the European Commission, is that the EPPO is “the sole competent prosecution authority 
in EPPO cases”.97 In effect, the existence of a judicial inquiry as organised under Belgian 
law does not affect the EPPO’s prosecution powers, it only impacts the way in which the 
EPPO conducts its investigation. The Belgian judicial inquiry is thus, in principle, not in-
compatible with the EPPO Regulation, even if it remains to be seen how it will practically 
function in the context of an EPPO investigation (infra, V). 
iv.2. Interpretation confirmed by the drafting history of the EPPO 
Regulation 
The above analysis is also supported by the drafting history of the EPPO Regulation. The 
history of the drafting of the EPPO Regulation indeed shows that the EU Member States 
did not intend to radically change the relation between public prosecutors and judges. 
The comparison between the wording of the Commission’s original proposal,98 interme-
diate versions of the text and the final Regulation is most telling, in particular with respect 
to art. 28(1) and recital 15 of the EPPO Regulation. 
In the Commission’s proposal, art. 18 (corresponding to current art. 28 of the EPPO 
Regulation) read:  
“The designated [EDP] shall lead the investigation on behalf of and under the instructions 
of the European Public Prosecutor. The designated [EDP] may either undertake the inves-
tigation measures on his/her own or instruct the competent law enforcement authorities 
in the Member State where he/she is located. These authorities shall comply with the instruc-
tions of the [EDP] and execute the investigation measures assigned to them”.99 
 
95 J Pradel, ‘Le parquet européen est-il compatible avec les juges nationaux de la mise en état en af-
faires pénales?’ cit. 
96 This is also expressed by the terms used in certain language versions of the Regulation: e.g., in Dutch 
“openbare aanklager”, a term that stresses the accusatory function of a public prosecution service. This 
choice is somewhat surprising because, in practice, this is just one of the many tasks performed by modern 
prosecutors. F Verbruggen, V Franssen, AL Claes and A Werding ‘Implementation of the EPPO in Belgium: 
Making the Best of a (Politically) Forced Marriage?’ cit. 
97 European Commission, ‘Draft Minutes VTC Meeting of the EPPO Expert Group’ (30 June 2020) 3, 
emphasis added. 
98 Proposal for a Regulation COM(2013) 534 cit. 
99 Emphasis added. Cfr other language versions of the EPPO Regulation: e.g., in German: “Der be-
nannte Abgeordnete Europäische Staatsanwalt leitet das Ermittlungsverfahren im Namen und nach den 
Weisungen des Europäischen Staatsanwalts. Der benannte Abgeordnete Europäische Staatsanwalt kann 
die Ermittlungsmaßnahmen entweder selbst durchführen oder die zuständigen Strafverfolgungsbehörden 
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The Commission’s proposal thus emphasised that the investigation would be led by 
the EDP and made no reference to national law. Moreover, the Commission’s proposal 
did not contain a recital similar to recital 15 of the EPPO Regulation. This indicates the 
more European-centred approach of the Commission, advocating in favour of a more far-
reaching integration of EU and national law. 
As explained above (supra, II), some Members States were quite reluctant to create a 
strongly centralised EPPO.100 Unsurprisingly, they substantially amended the initial pro-
posal, first in the hope to achieve consensus among all Member States, then opting for 
enhanced cooperation.101 
In the draft regulation of the Council of 31 January 2017,102 art. 18 of the Commission’s 
proposal was altered to art. 23, which reads as follows: “The [EDP] handling a case may, 
in accordance with this Regulation and with national law, either undertake the investiga-
tion measures and other measures on his/her own or instruct the competent authorities 
in his/her Member State. These authorities shall, in accordance with national law, ensure 
that all instructions are followed and undertake the measures assigned to them […]”.103 
The verb “lead” was thus deleted and replaced with “handling”, which has a less di-
rective connotation. Furthermore, the Council added no less than two references to na-
tional law, thereby increasing the role of national law when the EPPO conducts investiga-
tion measures.  
Moreover, in the above draft Regulation, the Council inserted a recital 10, which is 
identical to the text of current recital 15 of the EPPO Regulation, marking clearly the Mem-
ber States’ desire to leave more autonomy to the national legal system. 
The wording of the Regulation thus shifted from an EDP leading an investigation and 
giving orders to national authorities, to an EDP instructing national authorities to conduct 
 
in dem Mitgliedstaat, in dem er seinen Standort hat, dazu anweisen. Diese Behörden befolgen die Weisun-
gen des Abgeordneten Europäischen Staatsanwalts und führen die ihnen übertragenen Ermittlungsmaßnah-
men durch”; in French: “Le procureur européen délégué désigné mène l’enquête au nom et sur instructions 
du procureur européen. Le procureur européen délégué désigné peut soit procéder aux mesures d’en-
quête de sa propre initiative, soit donner instruction en ce sens aux autorités répressives compétentes de 
l’État membre où il est affecté. Ces autorités se conforment aux instructions du procureur européen délé-
gué et exécutent les mesures d’enquête dont elles sont charges” (emphasis added). 
100 Even before the Commission presented its proposal, France and Germany published a common 
memo in which they advocated in favour of a less European-centred EPPO. See D Flore, ‘Le parquet euro-
péen à la croisée des chemins’ cit. 234 and the references made there. Shortly after the publication of the 
Commission’s proposal, several national parliaments objected too, raising a so-called yellow card: V 
Franssen, ‘National Parliaments Issue Yellow Card against the European Public Prosecutor’s Office’ (4 No-
vember 2013) European Law Blog europeanlawblog.eu.  
101 D Flore, ‘Le parquet européen à la croisée des chemins’ cit. 234-235. 
102 Draft regulation Council doc. n. 5766/17 Interinstitutional File 2013/0255 (APP) Proposal for a Reg-
ulation of the European Council of 31 January 2017 on the establishment of the European Public Prosecu-
tor's Office. 
103 Emphasis added.  
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an investigation measure according to national law and thus leaving unaffected the way 
in which criminal investigations are organised at the national level. Consequently, if na-
tional law requires the intervention of an investigating judge and/or the opening of a ju-
dicial inquiry for a certain measure, this should be possible in EPPO cases.  
These arguments hold true for the final version of the EPPO Regulation, since the word-
ing of art. 28(1) and recital 15 remained unchanged in the later stages of the negotiations.104 
To conclude, there is no provision in the Regulation that expressly states that the 
EPPO must be able to conduct the investigation on an exclusive basis and the letter of 
the EPPO Regulation does, in our opinion, not prohibit Member States from preserving 
the current role of the investigating judge conducting a judicial inquiry in EPPO investiga-
tions.105 National criminal procedural law continues to apply to criminal proceedings re-
lating to EPPO cases.106 The foregoing analysis of the drafting history of a key article and 
recital of the EPPO Regulation corroborates that reading. The long negotiation process, 
the shift from a federal to a decentralised logic, and the insertion of multiple references 
to national law clearly show that the Member States did not wish for the EPPO Regulation 
to interfere too much with the national legal systems.  
V. Step-by-step analysis of a judicial inquiry in EPPO cases in Belgium: 
need for legislative amendments? 
Once clarified that a judicial inquiry is not prohibited by the EPPO Regulation, the ques-
tion remains to determine how an EPPO investigation conducted by an investigating 
judge could practically function in the Belgian legal system without requiring a major 
overhaul. Even if the role of the investigating judge as such is not incompatible with the 
Regulation, some legislative changes might still be necessary. In this Part, we will there-
fore discuss the different stages of an EPPO investigation in the hypothesis of a judicial 
inquiry, analysing at each step whether Belgian legislation is in conformity with the pro-
visions of the Regulation, and if not, what amendments are needed. Next, in Part VI, we 
will present the relevant provisions of the Belgian EPPO Act, which was adopted in Feb-
ruary 2021, and assess whether the amendments made are sufficient to resolve the prob-
lems identified in this Part. 
 
104 With the only minor and irrelevant exception that the final version reads “those” authorities and 
not “these”. 
105 This thesis is supported by J Pradel, ‘Le parquet européen est-il compatible avec les juges nationaux 
de la mise en état en affaires pénales?’ cit. 650. 
106 Y De Vries and SJ Lopik, ‘Het Europees openbaar ministerie komt eraan: waakhond of papieren 
tijger?’ (2019) Nederlands tijdschrift voor Europees recht 7. 
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v.1. The opening of the EPPO investigation  
An EPPO investigation can start in two ways.107 On the one hand, the EDP himself can 
start an investigation when there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence fall-
ing within the competence of the EPPO is being or has been committed.108 On the other 
hand, the EDP can exercise its right of evocation, i.e., take over a case from a judicial or 
law enforcement authority of a Member State that initiated the investigation and that, 
according to its obligation based on art. 24(2) of the EPPO Regulation, informed the EPPO 
about the existence of this investigation.109 Notwithstanding that the EPPO and national 
authorities have shared competences (i.e., both can prosecute EPPO offences), the 
EPPO’s competence has priority.110 However, the right of evocation exists only as long as 
the national investigation has not been finalised and provided that an indictment has not 
been submitted to a court.111  
The EPPO has to exercise this right of evocation within five days after receiving all the 
relevant information from the national authorities.112 During the five days period for the 
decision of evocation, the national authorities have to “refrain from taking any decision 
under national law that may have the effect of precluding the EPPO from exercising its 
right of evocation”.113 Nevertheless, they have to “take any urgent measures necessary, 
under national law, to ensure effective investigation and prosecution”.114 If the EPPO de-
cides to exercise its right of evocation, the national competent authorities will hand over 
the file to the EPPO and stop their own investigation.115 
In case of disagreement between the EPPO and the national authorities over the ques-
tion whether the criminal conduct falls within the material scope of the EPPO, “the national 
authorities competent to decide on the attribution of competences concerning prosecution 
at the national level shall decide who is to be competent for the investigation”.116 It is thus 
up to the Member States to decide which authorities will take this decision. 
 
107 Art. 25(1) EPPO Regulation cit. See also arts 41-42 of the Internal Rules of Procedure of the European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office, College Decision 003/2020 of 12 October 2020 (hereafter IRP). 
108 Art. 26(1) EPPO Regulation cit.  
109 Ibid. arts 24(2) and 27. 
110 Ibid. art. 25(1) and recital 58.  
111 Ibid. art. 27(7).  
112 Ibid. art. 27(1). 
113 Recital 58 seems to be broader than art. 27(2) as it states that “the authorities of Member States 
should refrain from acting, unless urgent measures are required, until the EPPO has decided whether to 
conduct an investigation”, whereas art. 27(2) only mentions “any decision under national law that may have 
the effect of precluding the EPPO from exercising its right of evocation”. 
114 Art. 27(2) EPPO Regulation cit. 
115 Ibid. art. 27(5). 
116 Ibid. art. 25(6). 
The Belgian Juge d'Instruction and the EPPO Regulation: (Ir)reconcilable? 375 
Clearly, the above rules do not cause a problem when a Belgian investigation is led 
by a national (local or federal) public prosecutor. Yet, does the EPPO’s right of evocation 
create any difficulty when the ongoing investigation is a judicial inquiry? 
Firstly, we can assume that the terms “judicial or law enforcement authority of a 
Member State”117 include the investigating judge. Therefore, the latter has the obligation 
to inform the EPPO if an investigation is initiated (whether at his own initiative or at the 
request of the public prosecutor or the victim, supra, III) concerning an offence that could 
fall within the competence of the EPPO. After informing the EPPO and while awaiting its 
decision, the investigating judge will still be able to take urgent investigation measures 
but, in accordance with art. 27(2) of the EPPO Regulation, will have to refrain from any 
measure that would render impossible the exercise of the EPPO’s right of evocation. 
Secondly, once the EPPO decides to use its right of evocation, it will take up the role 
of the public prosecutor, with all the rights this involves (supra, III). Yet, considering that 
the EPPO Regulation does not prohibit a judicial inquiry as the EU legislator did not wish 
to interfere too much with the way in which the criminal investigation is organised in the 
national legal systems, the investigating judge will continue to direct the judicial inquiry. 
The Belgian EDP handling the case for the EPPO will thus have the same position as a 
Belgian prosecutor in a judicial inquiry, with access to the case file and the possibility to 
request the investigating judge to undertake certain investigation measures (supra, III). 
Admittedly, one could claim that the wording of art. 27(5) of the EPPO Regulation, re-
quiring that if the EPPO exercises its right of evocation, the competent authorities of the 
Member States “transfer the file and refrain from carrying out further acts of investigation 
in respect of the same offence”, prohibits the investigating judge from continuing the inves-
tigation after the EPPO’s decision to exercise its competence. It should be noted, though, 
that art. 27(5) employs the terms “competent national authorities” and not, as in art. 24(2), 
“judicial or law enforcement authority” that initiated the investigation. So, in our view, it can 
be argued, also in the light of a general reading of the EPPO Regulation, that it is up to the 
Belgian public prosecution service – which is the competent national authority for the pros-
ecution – to transfer the file to the EPPO and to refrain from requesting the investigating 
judge to conduct further acts of investigation in respect of the same offence.  
Finally, the EPPO may only exercise its right of evocation “provided that the national 
investigation has not already been finalised and that an indictment has not been submit-
ted to a court”.118 The EU legislator thus uses a double criterion. 
In Belgium, as explained above (supra, III), when the investigating judge has com-
pleted the judicial inquiry, he sends the criminal file back to the public prosecutor, who 
drafts the final submissions and brings the case to the pre-trial tribunal. The latter will 
 
117 Ibid. art. 24(2). 
118 Ibid. art. 27(7).  
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then decide whether or not to refer the case for trial to the competent court.119 This de-
cision, once final, formally puts an end to the judicial inquiry and, at the same time, sub-
mits the case to the trial court.120  
It should be noted, though, that there may be a considerable lapse of time (months, 
sometimes even years) between the prosecutor’s final submissions and the referral or 
dismissal decision.  Amongst other factors, this is due to the fact that the pre-trial tribunal 
can decide that the investigation is incomplete and refer the file back to the public pros-
ecutor with the suggestion to accomplish certain investigation measures.121 The latter can 
then request122 the investigating judge to undertake additional investigation measures 
(with a right to appeal in case of refusal), or the judge can do so at his own initiative.123 
Subsequently, after having completed the investigation, which may again take consider-
able time, especially in cross-border investigations, the investigating judge turns the file 
over to the public prosecutor, who will draft new final submissions and bring the case, 
once more, to the pre-trial tribunal.  
The formal closing of the judicial inquiry with the referral or dismissal decision of the 
pre-trial tribunal, in our view, also corresponds to what the EU legislator had in mind 
when using the term “indictment”.124 As a result, the EPPO could exercise its right of evo-
cation until the decision of the Belgian pre-trial tribunal (or court)125 has become final.  
That said, for the sake of efficiency, it does not seem desirable to exercise this right 
after the national public prosecutor has brought the case with his (first) final submissions 
to the pre-trial tribunal. This could indeed delay the proceedings. Therefore, it would be 
useful for the EPPO to first consult its national counterpart before evoking the case, as 
provided by art. 27(4) of the EPPO Regulation: “the EPPO shall, where appropriate, consult 
 
119 Art. 128 CIC cit.  
120 Roughly summarized, the investigating judge’s competence ends when the pre-trial tribunal or 
court refers the case to the trial court or dismisses the case. For more details, see M Franchimont, A Jacobs 
and A Masset, Manuel de procédure pénale (Larcier 2012) 600 paras 68 and 608-618. 
121 To note that the pre-trial tribunal cannot order the prosecutor (nor the investigating judge) to un-
dertake such measures.  
122 As explained in Part III, the public prosecutor can never oblige the investigating judge to undertake 
certain measures. The same holds true for the pre-trial tribunal, as it situated to the same organisational 
level as the investigating judge – both belong to the court of first instance. Only the pre-trial court (upon 
appeal) can order the investigating judge to do so (art. 228 CIC cit.). 
123 M Franchimont, A Jacobs and A Masset, Manuel de procédure pénale cit. 616. 
124 To note that the meaning of the term “indictment” is not entirely clear in the EPPO Regulation, 
especially for systems with a pre-trial hearing (infra, V.4). For one, art. 27(7) refers to the submission of the 
indictment “to a court”. This “court” could be a pre-trial or a trial court, which makes a significant difference 
(supra, footnote 61). For another, the translation of the term “indictment” in other language versions of the 
Regulation creates confusion: e.g., “acte d’accusation” (in French), “Anklage” (in German) and “tenlasteleg-
ging” (in Dutch). For further analysis, see V Franssen, A Werding, AL Claes and F Verbruggen, ‘La mise en 
œuvre du Parquet européen en Belgique: Quelques enjeux et propositions de solution’ cit. 148-149. 
125 In the case there is an appeal against the decision of the pre-trial tribunal. See supra, III.  
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the competent authorities of the Member State concerned before deciding whether to 
exercise its right of evocation”.126  
v.2.  The conduct of the EPPO investigation 
As indicated above, the EDP will take up the role of prosecutor in a judicial inquiry and will 
have the same rights and powers as a national prosecutor in that situation127. Once the EPPO 
investigation is formally opened, the Belgian EDP will thus be able to request128 the Belgian 
investigating judge to take investigation measures in accordance with the rules of Belgian 
criminal procedure. In the hypothesis that a judicial inquiry has not yet been started, the 
EDP will have to ask an ex ante authorisation for coercive measures using the procedure of 
the mini judicial inquiry (supra, III). If the investigating judge refuses to authorise the re-
quested measure, the EDP will be able to contest this decision before the pre-trial court. By 
contrast, if the coercive measure is not possible under a mini-instruction in accordance with 
art. 28septies CIC, the EDP will have to open a judicial inquiry. 
According to arts 10(5) and 12(3) of the EPPO Regulation, the Permanent Chamber 
and the supervising European Prosecutor may give instructions to the EDP “whenever 
necessary for the efficient handling of the investigation or prosecution or in the interest 
of justice, or to ensure the coherent functioning of the EPPO”. Does this hierarchical right 
potentially create problems in the Belgian legal context? In fact, the EPPO Regulation itself 
endeavours to avoid conflicts between such instructions and national law. Indeed, the 
aforementioned provisions explicitly state that the instructions should be “in compliance 
with applicable national law”. If the Permanent Chamber or the European Prosecutor 
were to instruct the EDP to take a certain measure which the latter considers not to be in 
compliance with Belgian law (for example, a remote search of a computer system without 
the prior authorisation of an investigating judge,129 or a search of private premises with-
out launching a judicial inquiry)130, then he would have to “immediately inform the Per-
manent Chamber, proposing to amend or revoke the instructions received”.131 Should the 
Permanent Chamber deny the EDP’s request, the latter “may submit a request for review 
to the European Chief Prosecutor”.132 
 
126 Emphasis added. 
127 The compatibility of a judicial inquiry with a cross-border EPPO investigation will not be analysed 
in this Article. 
128 As explained above (supra, IV.1), there is no obligation under art. 30(1) and (4) of the EPPO Regula-
tion to give the EPPO the right to give orders to the investigating judge. 
129 Art. 88ter CIC cit. 
130 Ibid. art. 28septies. 
131 Art. 47(1) IRP cit. 
132 Ibid. art. 47(2). 
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v.3. The reallocation of an EPPO case from one Member State to another 
While the EPPO Regulation does not prohibit the Belgian judicial inquiry in EPPO cases, 
there are, however, two situations where the rules of the EPPO conflict with Belgian law. 
The first one133 concerns the reallocation of an EPPO case from one Member State to an-
other. According to art. 26(5) of the EPPO Regulation:  
“Until a decision to prosecute […] is taken, the competent Permanent Chamber may, in a 
case concerning the jurisdiction of more than one Member State and after consultation 
with the European Prosecutors and/or European Delegated Prosecutors concerned, de-
cide to:  
(a) reallocate the case to a European Delegated Prosecutor in another Member State;  
(b) merge or split cases and, for each case choose the European Delegated Prosecutor 
handling it, if such decisions are in the general interest of justice and in accordance with 
the criteria for the choice of the handling European Delegated Prosecutor [...]”.134 
Since the EPPO Regulation does not make a difference between a preliminary and a 
judicial inquiry, the Permanent Chamber must be able to reallocate a case in both situa-
tions until a final decision on the referral for trial has been made. The EPPO Regulation 
thus obliges Member States to allow a public prosecutor to remove a case from an inves-
tigating judge or pre-trial court, even if those judges do not agree. This raises the funda-
mental question whether a prosecutor can withdraw a case pending before a judge and 
override the latter’s decision. In principle, judges are independent and cannot be forced 
to follow orders or decisions of the public prosecution service (supra, III). 
Under current Belgian law, there are, however, already a number of situations where 
the public prosecutor's office can decide on the outcome of the criminal proceedings, 
notwithstanding the case is pending before a judge.  
The public prosecutor’s office can, first of all, conclude an out-of-court settlement 
with the suspect during the judicial inquiry135 and thereby terminate the criminal pro-
ceedings.136 This settlement is, however, subject to judicial review. Indeed, the pre-trial 
court will check whether different conditions (including the proportionality of the agree-
ment in the light of the seriousness of the facts and the suspect’s personality) are fulfilled, 
 
133 For the second one, see infra, V.5.  
134 See also arts 49-51 IRP cit. 
135 It should be noted that this possibility, which was created in 2011, was strongly criticised by legal 
scholars exactly because it derogates from the fundamental principle that a public prosecutor cannot re-
move a case pending before a judge and override the latter’s decision, all the more since there was no 
meaningful judicial review. In 2016, the law was amended to meet the concerns expressed by the Consti-
tutional Court and further punctual amendments were made in 2018. For an analysis of the current legal 
framework, see H Van Bavel and D Delwaide, ‘Enième réforme de la transaction pénale: la fin des contro-
verses?’ (2018) Journal des Tribunaux 765. 
136 Art. 216bis(2) CIC cit. 
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and if that is the case, approve the settlement.137 Similar rules apply to the mediation 
procedure laid down in art. 216ter CIC.138 
Second, as indicated above (supra, III), the public prosecutor's office can also request 
the pre-trial court to remove the investigating judge from the case in certain specific 
cases.139 
Third, in case multiple investigating judges think they are competent to conduct the 
investigation, there are different ways to dismiss one investigating judge in favour of an-
other. Following the formal procedure (called the règlement des juges),140 the Belgian Court 
of Cassation decides which investigating judge can continue the inquiry. The rules of this 
procedure are, however, cumbersome and therefore not often applied. A more favoura-
ble solution, developed in practice, is an informal dismissal of one investigating judge by 
the pre-trial tribunal, after consultation between the public prosecutors concerned.141 In 
our view, this informal procedure could also be used to reallocate the case to an EDP in 
another Member State. 
Still, the problem remains how the EPPO can reallocate a case in favour of an EDP in 
another Member State if the pre-trial tribunal does not agree with this decision of the 
EPPO. At present, a Belgian public prosecutor cannot force a pre-trial tribunal to approve 
his decision. Since an overall reform of Belgian criminal procedure is in the make (supra, 
III), it is not desirable to make major adjustments at this point. Nevertheless, reallocation 
must be possible because of the primacy of EU law.  
We believe inspiration can be drawn from an existing procedure for reallocating 
cases to international criminal tribunals. International criminal tribunals (except for the 
International Criminal Court) have primacy over the Belgian courts. If the prosecutor of 
an international criminal tribunal gives notice that he wishes to prosecute facts that are 
subject to a judicial inquiry in Belgium, the Court of Cassation will withdraw the case from 
the pre-trial judges after verifying that the facts fall within the competence of the tribunal 
and that no error was made regarding the person concerned. Such verification does not 
involve an assessment of the possible charges.142  
 
137 Ibid. art. 216bis(8). 
138 For an extensive analysis, see C Marr, ‘La médiation pénale à la suite de la loi du 18 mars 2018: de 
la médiation à la “procédure médiation et mesures”’ in V Franssen and A Masset (eds), Actualités de droit 
pénal et de procédure pénale (Anthemis 2019) 293. 
139 Art. 235 CIC cit.  
140 Ibid. art. 525 ff. 
141 MA Beernaert, HD Bosly and D Vandermeersch, Droit de la procédure pénale cit. 873-878, para. 1135: 
there is no text that explicitly provides for this possibility, but there is well established case law.  
142 After the withdrawal, prosecution in Belgium is no longer possible, unless the international tribunal 
has decided not to deliver an indictment or that the procedure is inadmissible. Arts 47-49 Loi concernant la 
coopération avec la Cour pénale internationale et les tribunaux pénaux internationaux. See, for example, Bel-
gian Court of Cassation judgment of 9 July 1996 n. P.96.0869.F. C Van den Wyngaert, P Traest and S Van-
dromme, Strafrecht en strafprocesrecht in hoofdlijnen (Maklu 2017) 1257-1258.  
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The Belgian legislator could create a similar procedure for reallocating EPPO cases to 
another Member State. Under this procedure the pre-trial tribunal and court would be 
obliged to confirm the withdrawal decision of the Permanent Chamber of the EPPO after 
a formal check of the material competence of the EPPO and the criteria for withdrawal of 
art. 26(5) of the EPPO Regulation. This way, the legislator would avoid that the Permanent 
Chamber is able to withdraw cases without intervention of a judge, and would ensure the 
protection of the suspect's right to a “natural judge”, which is part of the right to a fair 
trial, while also respecting the decision of the Permanent Chamber, as intended by the 
EU legislator.  
v.4. The closing of the EPPO investigation  
According to the EPPO Regulation, once the investigation is completed, the EDP has to 
send a report to the supervising European Prosecutor with a draft decision on the out-
come of the case:143 prosecution144 (with possibility for a simplified prosecution procedure 
if national law provides for it),145 referral to the national authorities,146 or dismissal.147 The 
supervising European Prosecutor subsequently transmits the draft decision to the Per-
manent Chamber,148 which will take the final decision.149 However, pursuant to art. 36(1) 
of the EPPO Regulation, the Permanent Chamber cannot dismiss a case if the EDP has 
proposed to bring the case to judgment. This provision also shows the high degree of 
decentralisation of the EPPO.150  
When there is only one Member State that has jurisdiction over the case and the Per-
manent Chamber decides to prosecute, it will bring the case to prosecution in the Member 
State of the handling EDP. By contrast, when several Member States have jurisdiction,151 
the Permanent Chamber will, in principle, also decide to bring the case to prosecution in 
the Member State of the handling EDP.152 Nevertheless, it may decide to prosecute in 
 
143 Art. 35 EPPO Regulation cit. 
144 Ibid. art. 36. 
145 Ibid. art. 40. 
146 Because the EPPO is not competent, because the conditions of arts 25(2) and (3) are not fulfilled 
anymore, or on the basis of the principle of prosecutorial discretion. Art. 34 EPPO Regulation; M Caianiello, 
‘The Decision to Drop the Case in the New EPPO's Regulation: Res Iudicata or Transfer of Competence?’ 
(2019) New Journal of European Criminal Law 186, 191. 
147 Art. 39 EPPO Regulation cit. 
148 Ibid. art. 35. 
149 Unless the Permanent Chamber has delegated its decision-making power to conclude the case 
before. Art. 55(1) IRP cit. 
150 T Huisjes, ‘Een Europees Openbaar Ministerie: kansen en risico's’ (2019) Proces 150. 
151 Arts 23 and 26 EPPO Regulation cit. 
152 Ibid. art. 36(3). 
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another Member State if there are sufficiently justified grounds to do so, taking into ac-
count the criteria set out in art. 26(4) and (5) of the EPPO Regulation.153 
Furthermore, art. 36(4) of the EPPO Regulation provides that “the Permanent Cham-
ber may, on the proposal of the handling [EDP], decide to join several cases, where inves-
tigations have been conducted by different [EDPs] against the same person(s) with a view 
to prosecuting these cases in the courts of a single Member State which, in accordance 
with its law, has jurisdiction for each of those cases”. 
Once decided in which Member State the case will be tried, “the competent national 
court within that Member State shall be determined on the basis of national law”.154 
How can these decisions of the Permanent Chamber be reconciled with the outcome 
of a judicial inquiry? As indicated in Part III, the pre-trial tribunal and court decide in Bel-
gium on the outcome of the judicial inquiry after receiving the public prosecutor’s final 
submissions. In contrast to e.g., French law,155 a Belgian investigating judge cannot refer 
the case to trial; neither does he have the power to bring the case to the pre-trial court, 
which will decide on referral. Only the public prosecutor can do so – this belongs to his 
prosecutorial powers. 
If the Permanent Chamber decides to prosecute in Belgium, to refer the case to the 
Belgian authorities or to dismiss the case, and the judicial inquiry took place in Belgium, 
there should not be any difficulties. Following the above reasoning that the EPPO Regu-
lation does not preclude a judicial inquiry and, more generally, does not affect the role of 
national judges, the intervention of pre-trial tribunals at the end of the investigation re-
mains unchanged. It should be noted that many legal systems, even without an investi-
gating judge, provide for some kind of “filter” at the end of the investigation, consisting in 
a pre-trial or preliminary hearing.156 Moreover, the EPPO Regulation explicitly refers to 
national law when it comes to determining the competent national court in the Member 
State where the prosecution of the EPPO case is taking place.157 Consequently, if the EDP 
receives the case file from the Belgian investigating judge after the judicial inquiry has 
been terminated, he drafts the final submissions, which reflect the decision taken by the 
Permanent Chamber, and brings the case to the pre-trial tribunal. 
At this stage, different scenarios are possible.  
 
153 Ibid. 
154 Art. 36(5) EPPO Regulation cit. Emphasis added. 
155 In France, the investigating judge also intervenes as a pre-trial tribunal at the end of the investiga-
tion, by adopting ordonnances de règlement. Arts 177-184 French Code of Criminal Procedure (Code de 
procédure pénale).  
156 For instance, in Italy, where the investigating judge was abolished in 1989 and the investigation is 
conducted by the public prosecutor, there is a preliminary hearing that very much resembles the role of 
the pre-trial tribunal in Belgium. See e.g., A Di Amato and F Fucito, ‘Italy’ in F Verbruggen and V Franssen 
(eds), International Encyclopaedia of Laws: Criminal Law (Wolters Kluwer 2016) 175-178.  
157 Art. 36(5) EPPO Regulation cit. 
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First, if the EPPO decides to prosecute, the pre-trial tribunal remains free to decide 
otherwise, in which case the EPPO will have to respect this decision. In this regard, there 
is no difference between the EPPO and the national public prosecutor’s office (supra, III). 
Second, if the EPPO decides to refer the case to the national authorities on the basis 
of art. 34 of the EPPO Regulation158 the EDP will transfer the case to the Belgian public 
prosecutor’s office. The latter will then take up its role within the judicial inquiry, either 
by preparing the final submissions or by requesting the investigating judge to conduct 
further investigation measures. 
Finally, if the EPPO decides to dismiss the case, it should be mentioned that the 
grounds for dismissal of a case pursuant to art. 39(1) of the EPPO Regulation are not 
necessarily the same grounds for which the Belgian pre-trial tribunal may finally decide 
to dismiss a case,159 like e.g., the dissolution of a suspect or accused legal person.160 This 
is however not problematic since art. 39(1) refers to national law; it is thus up to the pre-
trial tribunal to take the final decision on the (grounds for) dismissal.  
Nevertheless, there may be some difficulties if the Permanent Chamber decides to 
prosecute in another Member State although the judicial inquiry took place in Belgium.161 
Recital 78 of the EPPO Regulation is quite explicit: the EPPO Regulation, “requires162 the EPPO 
to exercise the functions of a prosecutor, which includes […] the choice of the Member State 
whose courts will be competent to hear the prosecution”.163 Hence, the EPPO Regulation 
could be interpreted as requiring the Permanent Chamber to decide formally on the com-
petent Member State for trial. Member States are thus obliged to allow a public prosecutor 
to remove a case from the Belgian investigating judge. To solve this problem, the legislator 
could hold on to the same solution as the one we advise to adopt when it comes to the 
reallocation of an EPPO case from one Member State to another (supra, V.3).  
v.5. The reopening of a closed EPPO case  
The second exception to the general principle that a decision taken by the EPPO cannot 
override the decision of a judge concerns the reopening of a closed EPPO case. According 
 
158 See also art. 57 IRP cit. 
159 For further analysis, see V Franssen, A Werding, AL Claes and F Verbruggen, ‘La mise en œuvre du 
Parquet européen en Belgique: Quelques enjeux et propositions de solution’ cit. 147. 
160 Under Belgian criminal procedure, the dissolution of the legal person does not necessarily put an 
end to the prosecution. Art. 20(2) Act holding the preliminary title of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Loi 
contenant le titre préliminaire du code de procédure pénale); S Van Dyck and V Franssen, ‘De strafrechtelijke 
verantwoordelijkheid van vennootschappen: wie, wanneer en hoe?’ in Orde van advocaten Kortrijk (ed), De 
vennootschap in de verschillende takken van het recht (Larcier 2013) 36-39. 
161 Pursuant to art. 36(3) or art. 36(4) of the EPPO Regulation cit. 
162 In French: “Le présent règlement fait obligation au Parquet européen”.  
163 Recital 78 EPPO Regulation cit. Emphasis added. Moreover, recital 79 states that: “[t]he Member 
State whose courts will be competent to hear the prosecution should be chosen by the competent Perma-
nent Chamber on the basis of a set of criteria laid down in this Regulation”. 
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to art. 39(2) of the EPPO Regulation, the Permanent Chamber must be able to decide to 
reopen a case when new facts surface that were not known to the EPPO at the time of 
the decision to dismiss the case.164  
Under Belgian law, if a case was dismissed by the pre-trial tribunal or court after a 
judicial inquiry and new facts (called charges nouvelles) appear, the public prosecutor will 
ask the investigating judge to start a new judicial inquiry. However, at the end of this new 
judicial inquiry, it is up to the pre-trial tribunal to assess independently the existence of 
new ‘charges’, together with the question whether or not to refer the case for trial to the 
competent court.165 
Yet, if the Permanent Chamber decides to reopen a closed EPPO case on the basis of 
new facts, the Belgian pre-trial tribunal and court seem to be bound by this decision. In 
other words, the Belgian tribunal or court will not be able to assess the existence of new 
facts as it does in non-EPPO cases. The wording of art. 39(2) of the EPPO Regulation (“shall 
not bar further investigation”) appears to aim at that result. While this requires an adjust-
ment in the conduct of the proceedings, there is no need for a legislative amendment. 
This “conflict” between the EPPO Regulation and national criminal procedure can be 
solved by interpreting the Belgian criminal procedure in conformity with EU law. 
VI. The Belgian EPPO Act: preserving the status quo 
In the meantime, the Belgian legislator has adopted new legislation to implement the 
EPPO into the national legal order. In this Part, we will first present some key features of 
this new legislation and, subsequently, focus on the judicial inquiry to assess whether the 
law meets the concerns expressed above to ensure conformity with EU law.  
vi.1. Brief overview of the Belgian EPPO Act 
The most important changes introduced by the Belgian EPPO Act for the purpose of our 
analysis are the following. 166 
First of all, the Belgian legislator opted to create an autonomous, stand-alone public 
prosecutor’s office for the Belgian European Prosecutor (hereafter EP)167 and EDPs, rather 
 
164 Art. 39(2) EPPO Regulation cit. and art. 59 IRP cit.; M Caianiello, ‘The Decision to Drop the Case in 
the New EPPO's Regulation: Res Iudicata or Transfer of Competence?’ cit. 194. 
165 Arts 246-248 CIC cit.; M Franchimont, A Jacobs and A Masset, Manuel de procédure pénale cit. 607-608. 
166 This overview does not include the legislative changes regarding the relation between the EDPs and 
the customs administration, which enjoys far-reaching autonomous investigation and prosecutorial pow-
ers under Belgian law. For an analysis of the concerns in that respect, see V Franssen, A Werding, AL Claes 
and F Verbruggen, ‘La mise en œuvre du Parquet européen en Belgique: Quelques enjeux et propositions 
de solution’ cit. 162-172. 
167 The EP is included as well, even though he is formally speaking part of the central office of the 
EPPO, presumably to ensure that he can conduct the EPPO investigation personally, in accordance with art. 
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than integrating them into the existing public prosecutor’s offices (e.g., in the Federal 
Prosecutor’s office, as we have proposed elsewhere).168 This new public prosecutor’s of-
fice is competent for the whole Belgian territory when prosecuting EPPO offences.169 
When conducting EPPO investigations, the EP and EDPs have the same investigation and 
prosecutorial powers as other Belgian public prosecutors.170 Consequently, whenever a 
national public prosecutor needs to request the authorisation of an investigating judge, 
so will the EP and EDP. Furthermore, the EP and EDPs will exercise the function of public 
prosecutor before national trial courts.171  
Secondly, when initiating an investigation concerning an offence that belongs to the 
material competence of the EPPO, the District Public Prosecutor (procureur du Roi), the 
Prosecutor General (procureur général) and the Federal Prosecutor (procureur fédéral) are 
obliged to inform the EDPs without undue delay.172 The specific rules for this notification 
will be determined in a (still to be adopted) memorandum (circulaire) of the College of 
Prosecutors General (collège des procureurs généraux). After the notification, the EDPs will 
decide whether to exercise the EPPO’s competence.173 In case of disagreement, the Dis-
trict Public Prosecutor, the Prosecutor General or the Federal Prosecutor can challenge 
the decision of the EDPs to conduct the criminal proceedings before the College of Pros-
ecutors General, which, after consulting the EDPs and the national public prosecutor, 
shall decide who is competent to deal with the case. No appeal is possible against the 
decision of the College of Prosecutors General.174 The College of Prosecutors General 
may, however, also decide to refer a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary 
ruling in accordance with art. 42(2)(c) of the EPPO Regulation. By contrast, in non-EPPO 
investigations, it is up to the Federal Prosecutor to decide which public prosecutor’s office 
is competent.175 Unfortunately, the explanatory memorandum to the EPPO Bill176 does 
not give a justification for this different procedure in EPPO cases.  
Thirdly, and most importantly for the subject of this contribution, the Belgian legisla-
tor has chosen to leave intact the judicial inquiry when it comes to EPPO cases. That said, 
 
28(4) of the EPPO Regulation. Nevertheless, this reference could, in our view, have been omitted as the 
EPPO Regulation defines the role and powers of the EP. 
168 V Franssen, A Werding, AL Claes and F Verbruggen, ‘La mise en œuvre du Parquet européen en 
Belgique: Quelques enjeux et propositions de solution’ cit. 151-154. 
169 Art. 156/1(1) Belgian Judicial Code cit., inserted by art. 3 Belgian EPPO Act cit. 
170 Art. 47quaterdecies CIC cit., inserted by art. 7 Belgian EPPO Act cit.  
171 Art. 156/1(2) Belgian Judicial Code cit. 
172 Ibid. art. 156/1(3). 
173 Ibid. art. 156/1(4), para. 1. 
174 Ibid. art. 156/1(4), para. 2. 
175 Ibid. art. 144ter(3).  
176 Explanatory Memorandum to the EPPO Bill, Doc. Parl., Ch. représ., sess. ord., 2020-2021, n. 55-
1696/001, 11-12. 
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specialised investigating judges will be designated.177 The selected judges should have 
useful experience in investigating offences which belong to the competence of the EPPO. 
Unlike the EDPs, these investigating judges can still work on other (i.e., non-EPPO) cases 
but shall give priority to those brought before them by an EDP (or the EP if he decides to 
conduct the EPPO investigation himself). In the event the specialised investigating judge 
is legally impeded, another non-specialised investigating judge belonging to the same 
court of first instance can, however, take over.178 
vi.2. Is the new Belgian legislation in conformity with the EPPO 
Regulation? 
The Belgian legislator thus agrees with our point of view that the judicial inquiry is not 
incompatible with the EPPO Regulation. Creating an exclusive group of investigating 
judges for EPPO matters was not strictly necessary; yet, it does send an important (polit-
ical) signal to the EU that EPPO cases are treated as a priority and it ensures that the 
investigation is conducted by a judge who is familiar with the hybrid and rather complex 
functioning of the EPPO. 
Following art. 5(6) and recital 69 of the EPPO Regulation, the Belgian investigating 
judge will of course have to sincerely cooperate with the EPPO.179 Conversely, the EPPO is 
also obliged to assist the investigating judge on the basis of the principle of loyalty that 
applies between the EU and its Member States.180 Therefore, it is of utmost importance 
for the investigating judge to have all relevant information at his disposal, in particular in 
the context of a mini judicial inquiry, in order to be able to decide whether the requested 
investigation measure is useful, proportionate and necessary.181  
It is important to highlight that the choice made by the Belgian legislator to maintain 
the judicial inquiry (and, of course, the mini judicial inquiry, where the investigating judge 
only intervenes punctually, but with the possibility to take over the investigation; supra, III) 
in EPPO cases, differs notably from the approach taken by the French legislator, who de-
cided in December 2020 that EPPO investigations would always be conducted under the 
authority of the EDP, thus excluding the possibility of a judicial inquiry in EPPO cases,182 and 
 
177 Art. 79 Belgian Judicial Code cit., amended by art. 2 Belgian EPPO Act cit. The designation of these 
judges is the responsibility of the First President of the respective courts of appeal. 
178 Art. 62bis CIC cit., as amended by art. 9 Belgian EPPO Act cit. 
179 Art. (5)6 and recital 69 EPPO Regulation cit.  
180 Case C-2/88 Zwartfeld and Others ECLI:EU:C:1990:440. 
181 Cfr art. 30(5) EPPO Regulation. 
182 Arts 696-115(2), 696-116 and 696-117 French Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended by Act n. 
2020-1672 of 24 December 2020 on the EPPO, on environmental criminal law and on special criminal law 
(Loi n. 2020-1672 du 24 décembre 2020 relative au Parquet européen, à la justice environmentale et à la justice 
pénale spécialisée), Journal officiel de la République française 26 December 2020 (hereafter French EPPO Act). 
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the Luxembourgish legislator, who will most likely follow the French example.183 Interest-
ingly, though, in Luxembourg the Council of State (Conseil d’Etat) has rendered a highly crit-
ical opinion on the EPPO Bill, in particular because the role of the investigating judge and 
his relation with the EDP is not clearly defined and because the proposed legislation is dif-
ficult to reconcile with national rules regarding the judicial inquiry.184 Most recently, the 
Spanish government approved a draft bill185 which attributes to the EPPO the authority to 
lead the investigation and opts for a pre-trial judge (juez de garantías) who will authorise 
certain investigation measures.186 If this draft bill is adopted, Spain will thus also discard the 
investigating judge in EPPO cases and perhaps, later on, also for all other cases. Indeed, like 
in Belgium, a broader reform of the Spanish criminal procedure is being prepared, including 
the abolition of the investigating judge in favour of a prosecutorial investigation with the 
punctual intervention of a pre-trial judge.187 And similar to Belgium, fundamental concerns 
have been expressed with respect to this aspect of the reform, which affects one of the 
essential characteristics of Spanish criminal procedure.188 
While the choice to maintain the judicial inquiry is, for the reasons put forward in Part 
IV, reconcilable with the EPPO Regulation, the question arises whether the Belgian EPPO 
Act adequately addresses the concerns expressed above in Part V. Contrary to the French 
EPPO Act and the Luxembourgish EPPO Bill,189 the Belgian EPPO Act is rather limited, 
thereby avoiding – quite rightly so – to repeat the provisions of the EPPO Regulation, 
which are directly applicable. Moreover, the Act also relies to a certain extent on further 
implementation by the College of Prosecutors General.  
With respect to the opening of an EPPO investigation, the Belgian legislator explicitly 
deals with the obligation to notify the EPPO set forward in art. 24(2) of the EPPO Regula-
tion. Whereas in our view the investigating judge could be considered a “judicial or law 
enforcement authority of a Member State” (supra, V.1), the Belgian EPPO Act allocates the 
 
183 Bill of 1 February 2021 on the implementation of the EPPO Regulation and amending the Code of 
Criminal Procedure (Projet de loi relative à la mise en application du règlement (UE) 2017/1939 du Conseil du 2 
octobre 2017 mettant en oeuvre une cooperation renforcée concernant la creation du Parquet européen et modifiant 
le Code de procedure pénale), Ch. sess. ord. 2020-2021 n. 7759 (hereafter Luxembourgish EPPO Bill). See in 
particular the newly inserted art. 136-6(1) of the Luxembourgish Code of Criminal Procedure. 
184 Council of State, Opinion on the Luxembourgish EPPO Bill, 27 April 2021, Ch. sess. ord. 2020-2021 
n. 7759/05, 6-8. 
185 The full text of the Spanish EPPO Draft Bill is available at: leyprocesal.com. 
186 Iustel, El Consejo de Ministros aprueba el Anteproyecto de Ley de la Fiscalía Europea (28 April 2021) 
www.iustel.com. 
187 See footnote 66. 
188 See e.g., L Bachmaier Winter, ‘Jueces de instrucción o fiscales’ (28 April 2020) ABC www.abc.es.  
189 It is worthwhile pointing out that the Luxembourgish Council of State severely criticises the ap-
proach of the government following the French example, arguing that national law should not repeat the 
provisions of the Regulation and only provide for further rules if the Regulation refers to national law or 
requires further implementation. Council of State, Opinion on the Luxembourgish EPPO Bill, 27 April 2021, 
Ch., sess. ord., 2020-2021, n. 7759/05, 2-3. 
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obligation to inform the EPPO to the public prosecutor,190 even in case of a judicial in-
quiry.191 The specific rules for the notification will be further detailed in a memorandum 
of the College of Prosecutors General. This approach is not necessarily problematic since 
the public prosecutor plays an active role in the Belgian judicial inquiry and is often the 
party who decides to open a judicial inquiry (supra, III). However, if the public prosecutor 
for some reason would fail to inform the EPPO, the investigating judge, in our view, still 
has the obligation to do so pursuant to art. 24(2) of the EPPO Regulation. 
In contrast, the Belgian EPPO Act does unfortunately not clarify the relation between the 
EPPO and the pre-trial tribunal and court. As explained in Part V, there are two situations 
where the Permanent Chamber must be able to overrule the Belgian pre-trial tribunal and 
court. On the one hand, there is the issue of the reallocation of EPPO cases to another Mem-
ber State. For the sake of legal certainty, the right to a fair trial (access to a judge) and the 
smooth functioning of the EPPO, we proposed a procedure where the pre-trial tribunal and 
court would be obliged to confirm the withdrawal decision of the Permanent Chamber of 
the EPPO after a formal check. The Belgian EPPO Act falls short in this respect. 
On the other hand, the Permanent Chamber must be also able to decide to reopen a 
case when new facts surface that were not known to the EPPO at the time of the decision 
to dismiss the case.192 If it decides to do so, the Belgian pre-trial tribunal and court are, in 
our opinion, bound by this decision. Here too, the Belgian legislator did not explicitly ad-
dress the issue and decided to merely rely on the direct applicability of the EPPO Regula-
tion and the primacy of EU law. While this approach is surely defendable, it requires na-
tional authorities (also those which are not specialised in EPPO cases) to know the EPPO 
procedure in order to avoid procedural mistakes. 
VII. Conclusion 
Following the analysis above, a careful reading of the EPPO Regulation does, in our view, 
not exclude the co-existence of the EPPO with the Belgian investigating judge in EPPO cases. 
The EU legislator deliberately created a margin of appreciation for the Member States. The 
recently adopted Belgian EPPO Act gratefully uses this margin of appreciation to avoid ma-
jor changes to the way in which criminal investigations are organised under national crimi-
nal procedure at a moment where a fundamental reform of the system is in preparation. 
Therefore, the Belgian legislator essentially preferred a status quo for the implementation 
of the EPPO. As the above step-by-step analysis in Part V has demonstrated, only minor 
legislative adjustments were indeed needed for the EPPO to be able to perform its tasks in 
 
190 Art. 156/1(3) Belgian Judicial Code cit. 
191 Explanatory Memorandum to the EPPO Bill, Doc. Parl., Ch. représ. sess. ord. 2020-2021 n. 55-
1696/001, 15. 
192 Art. 39(2) EPPO Regulation cit. and art. 59 IRP cit.; M Caianiello, ‘The Decision to Drop the Case in 
the New EPPO's Regulation: Res Iudicata or Transfer of Competence?’ cit. 194. 
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the current Belgian legal system, without abolishing the judicial inquiry. Other conflicts can 
easily be solved by interpreting Belgian law in conformity with EU law.  
To show its commitment to the EPPO project, Belgium opted for the creation of a 
separate public prosecutor’s office, consisting in a first phase of two EDPs who will work 
exclusively on EPPO investigations, in combination with the designation of specialised 
investigating judges, who will give priority to EPPO investigations. As we have argued else-
where, the creation of an isolated mini structure will not facilitate the integration of the 
EDPs in the national system, nor smoothen the cooperation with existing national au-
thorities causing tensions between the latter and the new EU body in terms of budget, 
qualified police investigators and technical resources. We would indeed have preferred 
a more integrated approach, while safeguarding the independence of the EDPs in con-
ducting their investigations.193 
In contrast, the designation of specialised investigating judges seems like a good mid-
dle-ground solution. Still, one might regret that the Belgian EPPO Act was formulated in 
a very general way and does not address some of the specific problems highlighted in 
Part V. Even if the issues with the hierarchical structure of the Permanent Chamber in 
relation with the Belgian investigating judge and pre-trial tribunal/court can be solved, to 
a certain extent, by the direct application of the EPPO Regulation, the Belgian EPPO Act 
could have brought more legal certainty by explicitly regulating them. 
Meanwhile, other countries with a judicial inquiry have chosen (France), or are likely 
to choose (Luxembourg, Spain) a different solution and set aside the investigating judge 
in EPPO investigations. What will be the impact of those radical choices in the internal 
legal order, remains to be seen. Without a doubt, the solution opted for by those other 
Member States puts Belgium in a unique position, but in our view the only correct one to 
avoid significant internal problems which would undermine the future investigations of 
the EPPO.194 As Bachmaier Winter rightly pointed out when referring to the problem of 
 
193 V Franssen, A Werding, AL Claes and F Verbruggen, ‘La mise en œuvre du Parquet européen en 
Belgique: Quelques enjeux et propositions de solution’ cit. 149-154. 
194 If a new set of procedural rules had been created merely for offences falling within the EPPO’s 
competence, while maintaining the existing rules for all other offences, the question would have arisen 
whether the difference in treatment (different procedures and levels of protection of defence rights) be-
tween suspects in EPPO investigations (without the possibility of a judicial inquiry), and suspects in ordinary 
national investigations (with a judicial inquiry) would not constitute an unlawful discrimination and hence 
create serious constitutional problems. As explained in Part III, in recent years, the Belgian Constitutional 
Court has increasingly criticised the discrepancies in applicable safeguards - between pre-trial and judicial 
inquiries (see the references in footnote 83). Therefore, if the Belgian legislator had opted for such a set of 
separate procedural rules for EPPO offences, discarding the judicial inquiry, it would not have been unlikely 
for the Constitutional Court to annul these rules, especially because there is no explicit EU prohibition to 
maintain the judicial inquiry in EPPO cases. This could, consequently, have undermined a large number of 
pending EPPO cases. For a further analysis, see V Franssen, A Werding, AL Claes and F Verbruggen, ‘La mise 
en œuvre du Parquet européen en Belgique: Quelques enjeux et propositions de solution’ cit. 159-160. 
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legal transplants and the increasingly predominant model of prosecutor-led investiga-
tions: “Estar en minoría no significa estar equivocado”.195  
Ultimately, only the Court of Justice can provide certainty on the correct interpretation 
of the EPPO Regulation, either upon a reference for a preliminary ruling, or presuming the 
European Commission would disagree with the options chosen by the Belgian legislator, 
via infringement proceedings against Belgium.196 But by that time, the reform of Belgian 
criminal procedure might be a fact, which would put a definitive end to the discussion. 
 
195 Free translation: “Being in the minority does not mean being wrong”. L Bachmaier Winter, ‘Jueces 
de instrucción o fiscales’ cit. 
196 For a more detailed analysis, see F Verbruggen, V Franssen, AL Claes and A Werding ‘Implementa-
tion of the EPPO in Belgium: Making the Best of a (Politically) Forced Marriage?’ cit.; V Franssen, A Werding, 
AL Claes and F Verbruggen, ‘La mise en œuvre du Parquet européen en Belgique: Quelques enjeux et prop-
ositions de solution’ cit. 159-160. 
 
